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TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY LOVING:
NATIONALITY, GENDER, AND RELIGION
IN THE MUSLIM WORLD
Adrien Katherine Wing*
INTRODUCTION
It scarcely seems possible that the Loving v. Virginia decision is now
forty years old.' In that case, decided more than ten years after the historic
Brown v. Board of Education school desegregation decision, 2 Virginia was
one of many states that forbade intermarriage between whites and blacks. It
took the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn a racist law and continue the
legacy of Brown in the area of intimate relations. Whole generations have
grown up in a United States where black-white marriage is legal, and such
intermarriage is growing in frequency. As an African American, I can
relate to the Loving decision on a personal level since my family includes
interracial couples. One brother-in-law has been married to a white Jewish
woman for over thirty years. My oldest son, who is himself biracial, has
been with his white wife for fifteen years. A number of my other sons have
dated interracially and view that issue through a more accepting lens than
my boomer generation did. As young black men, my sons have the ability
to date white women to a degree unprecedented historically. While the
reception for interracial couples is not unanimously welcome in all quarters,
black men do not fear lynching for daring even to look at a white woman.
Who could have imagined in the era of Loving that a biracial black man,
Barack Obama, with an African father and a white American mother, could
seriously run for President of the United States?
In 1903, famous black scholar and activist W.E.B. DuBois said that the
question of the twentieth century would be the color line, and he was
prophetically right within the U.S. context. The ongoing global war on
terror has raised the issue of whether the question of the twenty-first
century will be religious lines. Some prominent scholars, such as Samuel
* Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty
Development, University of Iowa College of Law; J.D., Stanford, 1982; M.A., UCLA, 1979;
A.B., Princeton, 1978. This essay arose out of Dean Wing's participation in the Fordham
Law Review's Symposium, Forty Years of Loving: Confronting Issues of Race, Sexuality,
and the Family in the Twenty-first Century. Dean Wing would like to thank her research
assistants, Saba Baig, Kevin Dawson, Meredith Friedman, Elizabeth He, Cynthia Lockett,
and Andrea Suzuki. She would also like to thank Tunisian lawyer Abdelkerim Chtourou.
1. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Huntington, have claimed that there is a "clash of civilizations" between the
Christian West and the Islamic world. While religion is clearly an
important identity for many people, in my view, it would be too simplistic
to state that the primary issue of the century will involve any one identity.
My own scholarship has emphasized the importance of the intersection of
multiple identities, a concept drawn from critical race feminism (CRF), and
I have edited two anthologies on this subject for New York University
Press: Critical Race Feminism3 and Global Critical Race Feminism.4 CRF
in its global dimension emphasizes the legal rights of women of color
around the world, with my own work focusing on women in the Muslim
world and Africa.
This essay highlights the intersection of three identities in particular:
nationality, gender, and religion, to show how a twenty-first-century Loving
issue still exists in many nations. In a number of countries, interfaith
marriages are still generally frowned upon due to customary and/or
religious norms, and in some places, such unions are illegal or impossible.
Interfaith marriages of any kind can be as problematic and as deadly as they
have been for centuries. There are some jurisdictions that forbid Muslims
from intermarriage altogether, such as Iran. On the other hand, there can be
successful interfaith unions, as my own family demonstrates.
While there are many interesting legal aspects to interfaith relationships
in this century, this essay will highlight one particular issue that draws upon
my own expertise. In many Muslim countries, it is legally forbidden for
Muslim women to marry non-Muslim men. Will this ancient, deeply rooted
prohibition join the fate of the Virginia antimiscegenation statute in Loving?
Will such laws be legislated out of existence any time in the near future?
Even if the legal prohibitions were lifted, would ongoing de facto norms
still hinder Muslim women from choosing marital partners freely? Part I
discusses various multiple identities of Muslim women and how they might
be implicated generally in this particular twenty-first-century Loving
problem. Nationality, gender, and religion, in particular, are among the
identities that intersect in ways that ensure most Muslim women would not
and cannot consider stepping beyond interfaith boundaries, just as many
American blacks and whites did not dare step beyond de jure racial
boundaries at the time of Loving. Subsequently, most would not violate the
de facto norms. Then, to provide further context, Part II elaborates upon
various aspects of Muslim family law, including the prohibition on
interfaith marriage for Muslim women. Most Muslim countries have not
been inclined to reinterpret religious norms to permit such intermarriage.
Finally, in Part III, the essay discusses possible solutions that could
potentially assist those Muslim women who do want the legal freedom to
marry outside their faith. The essay concludes that potential legal change in
3. Critical Race Feminism: A Reader (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2003).
4. Global Critical Race Feminism: An International Reader (Adrien Katherine Wing
ed., 2000).
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this arena is unlikely in the near future. Global trends toward increased
fundamentalism in all major religions may make interfaith intermarriage
more difficult rather than less so. Muslim women may continue to be
restricted de jure and de facto in their marital choices-leaving them
without loving options.
I. GLOBAL MULTIPLICATIVE IDENTITY
This part discusses the CRF notion of the intersectionality of identities
and its applicability to Muslim women. Kimberl& Crenshaw,
UCLA/Columbia law professor, has written movingly of the difficulty U.S.
law has had with handling discrimination against black women on the
simultaneously arising grounds of race and gender.
5
In my own consulting career, I have assisted the African National
Congress (ANC) Constitutional Committee of South Africa as it drafted the
first democratic constitution for that country. The ANC reviewed the
American experience with constitutional and statutory equality, and decided
to take a much more comprehensive and complex approach. The South
African equality clause mentions seventeen grounds, i.e., identities that are
afforded protection: "race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience,
belief, culture, language and birth.' '6 The South African Constitutional
Court has noted that grounds may intersect, and thus discrimination cannot
be evaluated on one identity only.7 For example, Justice Albie Sachs noted
in one case that African widows have suffered as "blacks, as Africans, as
women, as African women, as widows and usually, as older people,
intensified by the fact that they are frequently amongst the lowest paid
workers." 8
Additionally, I have written about other identities not mentioned in South
Africa: nationality, parental status, minority group status, geographic
location (urban/rural), and one I call stature identity. This latter concept
focuses on how one appears within a particular societal context. If you
match the predominant standards of beauty, you will probably do better in
the educational and employment spheres than if you do not.
To illustrate the intersections of identities in the case of a Muslim
woman, I offer the plight of a fictional character, Amira. Her story
represents a composite of issues I have heard and read about in my many
visits to France. She is a very dark-skinned Arab female, who is
unemployed, Sudanese, and Muslim, wears a head scarf and lives as an
illegal immigrant in rural France. But she does not speak French very well
5. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politic:,
1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139.
6. S. Afr. Const. 1996 § 9(3).
7. Nat'l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equality & Another v Minister of Justice & Others
1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at 58-59 (S. Aft.).
8. Id. at 59.
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and is single and disabled. She is pregnant by a white Christian Frenchman,
Phillippe. Amira would like to marry Phillippe, as interfaith marriages are
legal in France, but such a marriage could be rejected in her home country
if she ever dared return there. She might even be subject to physical attack
by family members. Phillippe is agnostic but is Catholic by descent, which
is another fact that might subject them to attack if he dared accompany her
to Sudan. Thus, she has asked Phillippe to convert to Islam, as required by
Islamic law in most Muslim countries. He refused upon learning that
conversion to Islam is irrevocable.
Amira has several other reasons not to return to Sudan for the foreseeable
future. While she is a devout Muslim, she is against the Islamist regime
there, and escaped from an abusive marriage where she was the third
polygamous wife of a Sudanese government official who visited France.
She and her daughter, Jamila, vanished after a shopping trip in Paris and
then fled to a rural area to avoid detection. Before she can marry Phillippe,
Amira thinks that she will have to get a divorce from her husband in Sudan.
Maybe French law will regard her arranged polygamous marriage, which
took place when she was thirteen, as invalid? Maybe her husband has
already divorced her? If all this is too complicated to solve in a few
months, the baby will be born out of wedlock. Having such a child is
somewhat tolerated in France, but is against all customary and religious
norms in her country; as a result, she might be subject to stoning for
adultery.
Amira lost her underground job in the village when she insisted on
wearing a head scarf to work. She also had been unable to tolerate the
fumes in the factory and is now easily winded, a condition that excludes her
from many work options. Jamila has been sent home from her high school
several times because she wore a head scarf, which is forbidden in French
public schools. Amira and Jamila have not been getting along recently, as
Amira does not like some of Jamila's new friends, who are part of the gay
and lesbian community at the school. Jamila needs to finish high school so
she can get a job to support Amira and the new baby, since Amira's
situation with Phillippe may not work out. If Amira pressures Jamila too
much, Jamila might leave her pregnant mother and/or drop out of school.
Amira is strikingly beautiful by both French and Sudanese standards and
would like to seek work as a model, assuming she can relocate to an urban
area and obtain asylum to correct her undocumented status. Since she is
devout, however, she would not want to wear very revealing clothing. She
is also afraid that any notoriety might alert her Sudanese husband to her
location.
While all of the various identities illustrated in Amira's story exist within
each of us in some form, we usually only contemplate one or two of them at
a time. Women of color like Amira and Jamila are often discriminated
against on multiple bases simultaneously, but may have no practical legal
recourse in any jurisdiction. Amira's problems arising out of her religious
[Vol. 762898
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identity are only one thread of a tapestry of issues relating to all of her
identities.
It is important to note that some of the identities can also lead to
privileging on one or more levels. For example, the fact that I am an
African American, feminist, secular, female law professor, and a Protestant,
minority-group, heterosexual mother of five, who mainly speaks English,
has a bad back, and conforms to the dominant standards of beauty in the
United States and the Middle East, has helped and hurt me simultaneously
in my twenty-five years of work in the Muslim world. As an American
upper-middle-class person, I am often globally privileged with the capacity
to travel where I please. As an international law professor, I am often
treated as an honorary male and interact with Muslim male colleagues in
ways that Muslim women cannot. As a primarily secular person brought up
in a mainstream Protestant home, I have been able to talk to devout
Christians, Muslims, and Jews in a way I could not were I deeply identified
with one faith. Globally, I have been accorded great respect as a mother of
all sons. My looks resemble those of many Middle Easterners, who often
embrace me as a family member. My face also protects me against anti-
American sentiment, since I do not "look" American. Around the world,
many people perceive African Americans as an oppressed group and
identify with me on that basis as well.
II. MUSLIM FAMILY LAW
This part illustrates how religious identity intertwines with the nationality
and gender identities of Muslim women, who might want to intermarry with
non-Muslim men. Islam is a faith for more than one billion people in the
world. Its principles are supposed to guide its adherents in their everyday
lives. The Islamic law known as shari'a used to govern most areas of law,
including contract, criminal, trusts and estates, and family. Today, many
predominantly Muslim countries only apply shari'a in the area of family
law-marriage, divorce, and child custody-as well as in trusts and estates.
Other areas of law may be influenced by Western civil, criminal, and
constitutional law. Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and certain states in Nigeria may
be among the few Muslim jurisdictions to apply shari'a in the area of
criminal law, often amputating hands for theft or stoning people for
adultery. These types of jurisdictions may give classical punishments for
the listed hudud offenses-apostasy, adultery/fornication, theft, slander,
brigandage, wine drinking, and rebellion. Conversion out of Islam is the
forbidden (haram) crime of apostasy in most places, and the penalty may be
death. In some jurisdictions, any Muslim can carry out the penalty and will
not be prosecuted.
The following are general Islamic principles that apply to family law.
There may be nuanced differences in each country, and very few countries
have done a thorough reconceptualization of their laws on marriage. In
Islam, men and women are equal in the eyes of God, but they have different
responsibilities. Women have the duty of obedience (ta 'ah) to men, which
28992008]
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many men use to justify the right to discipline their wives physically. In
turn, men have the duty of guardianship (qawama) over women. Men have
the right to marry four wives, whom they must treat equally. The women
must be of the book (kitab), i.e., Christian, Muslim, or Jewish. Muslim
women can only marry one man; no polyandry is allowed. Men must give a
bride price (mahr) to women. Unlike certain cultures where payment is
given to the bride's family, this amount is payable only to the bride. Since
it is substantial and may depend on the educational level of the woman, it
may be paid out over time and is meant to ensure that she has some
resources in the event of divorce or the death of her husband. Since
homosexuality is forbidden, most Muslim countries are not likely to join the
growing Western trend of permitting gay marriages in the near future.
Many Muslims may agree with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
who recently said that there were no gay people in Iran. 9 Some have told
me that they view homosexuality as a Western disease that does not exist in
the developing world.
Divorce (talaq) is relatively easy for men in most countries. They only
need to say "I divorce you" three times, whereas women need specific
grounds. Alimony is only granted to women for three months (iddat), just
long enough to ascertain if she is pregnant by her ex-husband. With respect
to child custody, fathers are considered the legal guardians, even if women
are granted physical custody for a few years (usually prepuberty) or even up
to the age of majority. The child's religion and nationality is determined by
the fathers in most instances. Muslim women can inherit, but male relatives
get a double share as compared to their sisters. As I learned in Syria, in
many jurisdictions, if a non-Muslim woman marries a Muslim man, she
cannot inherit from her husband.
While these rules are symbols of inequality in the modern era, they made
sense historically since women were always protected. Even today, women
remain under the legal jurisdiction of their father's or their husband's
family. After divorce, they return to the jurisdiction of their father's family;
they do not have the obligation to support their family, and they may keep
any money they earn for themselves.
As previously mentioned, Muslim women cannot marry non-Muslim
men in most Muslim jurisdictions. Many Western liberals would not take
issue if a Muslim woman chose not to marry a non-Muslim man because
she views intermarriage as sinful under her religion. Koranic verse 2:221
states, "Nor marry (your girls) to unbelievers until they believe." The
historic reason for the rule is that women are regarded as the weaker sex
and might be tempted away from their faith by dominant men, who are the
family heads of household. Men are women's legal guardians, and thus
might convince women to convert out of their religion. If women remain
Muslim, their husbands might disrespect their right to wear head scarves or
9. Ahmadinejad Speaks; Outrage and Controversy Follow, CNN.com, Sept. 24, 2007,
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/09/24/us.iran/index.html.
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cause them to violate Islamic norms by forcing them to cook pork or serve
them alcohol.
There are notable exceptions in the Muslim world to religiously based
family law. Turkey has a secular marriage law and has abolished
polygamy, prohibited religious political parties, and, until recently,
restricted the wearing of head scarves in schools and public buildings.10 In
Turkey, Muslim women can marry non-Muslim men, and there are some
couples, but the number is small since the country is predominantly
Muslim. Families react differently to such arrangements, with some
terminating communication permanently and others only warming to the
situation upon the arrival of grandchildren. The husband and wife may ask
each other to convert, but Turkish women are more likely to do so, which is
legal. Jewish and Armenian Turkish men and their families are afraid of
assimilation, and are even more likely to insist that the Muslim female
spouse convert.
Tunisia is another Muslim country that has followed a secular path in
most respects. I  Using Islamic reinterpretation (jtihad), it abolished
polygamy soon after independence. It has also abolished the duty of
obedience, made divorce equally accessible to both genders, and prohibited
head scarves in public buildings. Interestingly, while intermarriage by
Muslim women is technically permitted, an administrative ordinance
prohibits it. 12 There is also some indication that the non-Muslim man must
convert and the religious authority known as the mufti must give the
certificate to the city hall, with the entire process taking three months or
more. 13
III. SOLUTIONS
This part discusses both legal and nonlegal solutions. One legal solution
is Islamic reinterpretation. As previously mentioned, Tunisia used Islamic
reinterpretation Qijtihad) to ban polygamy. In attempting to secularize the
Tunisian legal system, the country's first president, Habib Bourguiba,
realized that basing change on Islamic principles would be more culturally
valid than would be basing it on perceived Western secular principles. On a
similar note, in previous scholarship, I have argued that there is a need to
10. See Adrien Katherine Wing & Ozan 0. Varol, Is Secularism Possible in a Majority-
Muslim Country?: The Turkish Example, 42 Tex. Int'l L.J. 1 (2006).
11. See Adrien Katherine Wing & Hisham Kassim, The Future of Palestinian Women's
Rights: Lessons from a Half-Century of Tunisian Progress, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1551,
1556 (2007).
12. See Alya Cherif Chamari, Le Droit de Citoyennet des Femmes au Magreb, in Droits
de Citoyennet& des Femmes au Maghreb 175, 179 (1997); see also U.S. Dep't of State,
Tunisia: International Religious Freedom Report 2006,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71433.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
13. See Consular Section, U.S. Embassy Tunis, General Guidance for American Citizens
Living in Tunisia 31 (n.d.), available at http://tunisia.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/SK-
90WC2shiA4yxHOgJnKQ/amcit-booklet.pdf.
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support some existing progressive Islamic reinterpretation in the Palestinian
women's rights context. 14
There are some Islamic scholars, such as Azizah al Hibri, who have
challenged the predominant interpretation of verse 2:221 as prohibiting
intermarriage for women. She has reinterpreted the qawama guardianship
principle to show that it must be understood in its historical patriarchal
context of almost total female reliance on male support. Today, the options
for women are much broader, and many live in societies where they receive
education, marry later, have the possibility of limiting their family size, and
work outside the home. Thus, there is no longer the need for the
guardianship principle.
In Tunisia, women are now recognized as having equal rights to divorce.
Extrapolating further, could it not then be argued that they should have
equal rights to marry? As mentioned, an administrative ordinance is
currently limiting their legal options.
Throughout the world, it is no longer necessary to regard men as heads of
households. Using the example of the Prophet Muhammed's first wife,
Khadijah, who was a divorced business woman fifteen years older than he, I
ask why Muslim women cannot keep their religion no matter whom they
marry. Since modem studies show that mothers have the most impact on
their children's religious beliefs, would not the Muslim community grow if
mothers as well as fathers were considered capable of passing on their
religion to the children?
Since it is extremely difficult to gather internal sectarian momentum to
change religious norms, a constitutional approach may have slightly more
possibility for success. On a national level, most countries today have
constitutions with a gender equality clause, including those in the Muslim
world. Ironically, the United States still does not, and perhaps we can learn
from these countries. In the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, we have not
yet heard any of the candidates discuss the long-dormant proposed Equal
Rights Amendment. Unfortunately, many of these global gender equality
clauses are in the same position as the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments at
the time of Loving-unenforced or underenforced. Most countries are still
treating women far worse than men by every indicator.
There is a conflict in most Muslim countries' constitutions between the
gender equality clause and the clause that says that Islam is the national
religion and that shari'a is a source or the source of law. Thus, this conflict
perpetuates ancient patriarchal customs, resulting in the continuation of
centuries-old subordination, which a twentieth- and twenty-first-century
idea of gender equality cannot trump.
The international community now has a whole additional layer of law
that did not really exist at the time of Loving-international human rights
14. See generally Adrien Katherine Wing, Custom, Religion, and Rights: The Future
Legal Status of Palestinian Women, 35 Harv. Int'l L.J. 149 (1994).
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law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 15 (UDHR) was
developed in 1948 during the height of American apartheid, with former
First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt driving the movement for its adoption. The
UDHR mentions freedom of religion as well as equal rights in marriage, but
it is a nonbinding declaration. It is a little like saying "I declare I love
you"--a lovely sentiment but not one to take a country to court for
violating. Some scholars do view the UDHR as customary international
law, which is binding on all nations, and thus would advocate using it in a
court of law.
Two very important relevant international treaties were issued in 1967,
which evolved during the 1950s: the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights 16 (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights 17 (ICESCR). These documents were also
inspired in part by the U.S. civil rights movement. ICCPR article 18 allows
freedom of religion and conversion. This treaty binds every country that
signs and ratifies it. Some countries, like the United States, consider such a
treaty non-self-executing and require implementing national legislation.
Some nations make reservations, understandings, and declarations that
further limit their obligations. According to the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, such limitations are not supposed to conflict with the
"object and purpose of the treaty,"'18 and other countries can lodge
objections if they see fit. 19 Unfortunately, there is no international police
force to put a violating country in jail.
In 1981, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) was issued, and its article 16 discusses the right to
found a family and choose a spouse freely, as well as the responsibility of
both spouses to undertake equal duties with respect to marriage, divorce,
and children. 20  Many countries have gutted CEDAW by making
reservations, finding that it conflicts with their customs or religion; some
scholars question whether CEDAW is compatible with shari'a.2 1
If a Muslim woman is living in a country that has accepted its obligations
under the ICCPR and CEDAW and that has a gender equality clause in its
constitution, she may be able to pursue a claim in several places. The
national courts might hear a claim under the constitution as well as under
15. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810
(Dec. 10, 1948).
16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368.
17. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
18. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19(c), done May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
19. Id. art. 20.
20. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art.
16, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
21. See, e.g., Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the
Shari'a and the Convention Compatible?, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 1949 (1995).
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the international treaties. Many countries are much more open to hearing
claims under international law than the U.S. Supreme Court has been. In
addition, there are treaty body committees. The Human Rights Committee
can hear complaints regarding the ICCPR, and the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women hears CEDAW-based
claims. The treaty-based bodies are very slow, backlogged, and lack
sufficient enforcement mechanisms. For example, with respect to the
ICCPR, matters raised by individuals or nongovernmental organizations
cannot be heard unless a country has ratified the relevant Optional Protocol.
Furthermore, if a claim occurs in a country that is part of a developed
regional human rights system, such as Europe or the Americas, an
aggrieved party may bring a case under the relevant regional human rights
treaty and may also raise international treaties and national laws. Europe
and the Americas already grant religious freedom in marriage, following the
ICCPR lead. The regions that have countries that prohibit or restrict
interfaith marriage, particularly for Muslim women, do not have appropriate
regional options. Unfortunately, the African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights is still in its embryonic stage, and the Middle East and Asia do not
have regional courts or regional treaties at this time. While there is an
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 22 there is only a draft
Charter on Human Rights23 for the Arab world.
It should be remembered that law is necessary but not sufficient to
change hearts and minds on sensitive issues. There are other solutions as
well. In the long term, education is an important solution, and media can be
an important tool in educating children and adults. While the Internet is a
growing source of information, newspapers, television, and especially radio
can also make a difference even in the poorest of countries. Sometimes we
learn from our own families. Seeing harmonious relations between
interracial or interfaith couples and their children during Thanksgiving or
Ramadan can do more to change traditional outlooks than any outside
media source. As Americans with legal training, we have privileging in
many of our identities that allows us to become involved in various human
rights causes in our own country as well as around the world. While each
of us will no doubt gravitate to our favorite causes, perhaps others of us will
decide to educate ourselves and others, and support the human rights of
Muslim women wherever they may be. One aspect of that struggle may be
the right to interfaith marriage for the brave few that embrace that path.
22. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981,
1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
23. Council of the League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, adopted Sept.
15, 1994, reprinted in 18 Hum. Rts. L.J. 151 (1997).
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CONCLUSION
The Lovings sued to overturn the Virginia antimiscegenation law, a
daunting task in the context of the 1960s South, even with the ten-year-old
Brown decision in place. Supporting the Loving family would not have
been easy in Virginia in 1967, and it may still not be easy in many parts of
the United States today. Even some forty years after Loving, the number of
black-white interracial couples is still very small, with considerable family
and societal stigma attaching to those who do not follow the normal trend of
marrying within their race.
Muslim women desiring to marry on an interfaith basis in many Muslim
countries may face even more daunting odds. The rise in fundamentalism
around the world may mean it is less likely that religious norms may change
in the near future. On a broader level, women are still underrepresented in
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, the very places where the
battles to change laws take place. Women still do most of the housework
and child care globally, leaving little time for activism. The natural desire
to marry within one's nationality, ethnicity, and faith make it very unlikely
that much pressure will build up to change the laws. Economic problems
can limit marriage options generally, especially for Muslims with respect to
provision of the expensive bride price.
Gender discrimination manifests itself in numerous ways, and restrictions
on the right to marry across faith lines are unlikely to make it to the top of
human rights priority lists. Nevertheless, surprising changes can occur. If a
biracial man can become President of the United States, maybe one day a
Muslim woman who marries a non-Muslim man could become leader of her
Muslim country as well.
2008] 2905
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